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We rst estimate a dynamic game for the global automobile industry and
then compute a Markov Perfect equilibrium to study the equilibrium relation-
ship between market structure and innovation. The key state variable in the
model is the eciency level of each rm and the market structure is character-
ized by the vector of eciency levels across all rms. Eciency is estimated
to be stochastically increasing in the dynamic control|innovation|which is
proxied by patenting behavior. Equilibrium innovation is a function of all state
variables in the industry and the cost of R&D which includes a privately ob-
served cost shock. We nd that it exhibits the following patterns: 1) innovation
by the industry leader is decreasing in the eciency of other rms; 2) innova-
tion is decreasing in the eciency dispersion; 3) innovation is more concentrated
that eciency; 4) innovation is declining in the number of active rms; 5) the
innovation gap between the leader and other rms increases with competition.
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Schumpeter (1942) advanced the controversial argument that monopoly is more
conducive to innovation than highly competitive markets. An extensive literature
sprung up investigating the eects of market structure on innovative activity, but
it has proven dicult to identify robust empirical results. Cohen and Levin (1989)
highlight several methodological diculties that have plagued empirical work. The
absence of a monotone relationship and the endogeneity of market structure are two
of the most important problems.
A number of theoretical studies have demonstrated that the competition-innovation
relationship is monotonic only under restrictive conditions (Gilbert 2006). One rea-
son for this is the opposing impact of the `eciency' and `replacement' eects. The
former leads to lower innovation incentives in more competitive situations where
aggregate industry prots are lower. The latter leads to lower innovation incentives
for a monopolist that has existing prots at stake. Aghion et al. (2005) demonstrate
in an explicit model of rm optimizing behavior that the relationship between com-
petition and innovation should have a nonlinear `inverted-U' pattern. They conrm
with data for U.K. rms that stronger competition is associated with higher inno-
vation if competition is low, but that the relationship is inverted when competition
is already high.
A second problem for empirical work is the endogeneity of market structure, in
particular reverse causality from innovation to market structure. Vives (2008) shows
that robust patterns in a set of empirically relevant cases remain sensitive to the
assumption of an exogenous market structure versus endogenous entry. The issue
has been ignored in much of the empirical literature, although a few studies have
exploited quasi-natural experiments where market structure changed exogenously.
Carlin, Schaer, and Seabright (2004) exploit the sudden introduction of competition
after the communist model is abandoned in transition countries. Aghion et al.
(2005) instrument the change in competition with policy variables associated with
the integration of the U.K. economy into the European market.
A host of other factors make it dicult to identify a stable empirical relation-
ship between innovation and market structure. It matters greatly how innovation
is exactly introduced in the model. Opposite eects have been demonstrated for
product versus process innovations (Boone 2000a), for discrete innovations that do
or do not make an existing technology obsolete (Gilbert 2006), and for cases with
or without complementarities between dierent innovation decisions (Kretschmer,
Miravete, and Pernias 2009). Furthermore, it is dicult to identify the relationship
1from cross-sectoral variation because prot opportunities and innovation costs vary
as well. Market structure variables often turn insignicant if many controls are in-
cluded (Gilbert 2006). Blundell, Grith, and Reenen (1999) rely on within-sector
comparisons instead, but rm heterogeneity still makes it dicult to identify a stable
relationship between innovation and a rm's competitive position (Boone 2000b).
All of the above factors are problematic for reduced form studies that regress a
measure of innovation on a measure of competition or market structure. Coecient
estimates will be sensitive to functional form assumptions and to the controls in-
cluded. In contrast, we propose to study the relationship in an explicit dynamic
model of strategic decision making where the absence of robust monotone eects is
not a problem, an approach urged by Cohen and Levin (1989), Gilbert (2006), and
Sutton (2008). Instead of looking for a relationship that holds similarly everywhere,
we can focus on local eects or investigate which control variables are crucial. Op-
posing eects of market structure on innovation, and vice versa, can be isolated once
the primitives of the model are estimated.
We have chosen to estimate the model for the global automotive industry which
is highly innovative, both in terms of R&D expenditure and patents granted. Many
rms have experienced pronounced changes in their competitive position over the
study period, 1982{2004, which provides identifying power to estimate the structural
parameters. The more globalized operations of some initial regional rms have made
the global market structure more symmetric with a diminished role for fringe rms
and for the very largest rms.
In our model, each rm produces a dierentiated product that is characterized
by the rm's product quality or, interpreted alternatively, the rm's eciency level.
A rm's market share is determined by its price and its relative eciency. The price
is chosen strategically in each period, taking all eciencies as given. A rm can
stochastically increase its eciency by investing in R&D, which is a strategic and
forward looking decision. A rm takes the actions of its rivals and their possible
future states into account.
A few other papers study the interrelation between innovation and market struc-
ture in a dynamic model of strategic interaction. Goettler and Gordon (2009) study
the microprocessor industry and explicitly incorporate the durable nature of the
good by making demand and price setting dynamic as well. They study the im-
pact of market structure on innovation by a counterfactual analysis of monopoly
innovation, relying on the primitives estimated from the actual AMD-Intel duopoly.
Their nding that as a monopoly Intel would innovate more depends crucially on the
durable nature of the good. Upgrades are necessary to stimulate demand and they
2only happen if consumers value quality highly and are relatively price insensitive.
Xu (2008) analyzes innovation decisions in the Korean electric motor industry.
In addition to the cost of R&D, he also estimates R&D spillovers, adjustment costs
of physical investment, and the distribution of plant scrap value. As he uses the
oblivious equilibrium concept of Weintraub, Benkard, and Roy (2008), there is no
strategic interaction between plants in the innovation decision. Plants only optimize
relative to a stable industry state.1 Finally, Siebert and Zulehner (2010) study
the reverse question of ours, i.e. how innovation aects market structure. In their
study of the DRAM industry, they estimate the evolution of sunk entry costs as the
innovation intensity and market demand increase over time. Through their eect
on entry and exit, these costs determine equilibrium market structure.
We dier from these other studies in a number of ways. First, we model a con-
tinuous control variable, innovation, rather than the zero-one decision in the more
common discrete dynamic games. It leads us to the two-step estimation strategy of
Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007), which does not require to solve for the equilib-
rium. This estimator has only been used in a few other empirical applications.2
Second, we are the rst to estimate a model of dynamic industry equilibrium for
the automobile industry, which has been a popular proving ground for static models
in industrial organization. Hence, we can study the innovation-market structure
relationship using functional form assumptions that are well understood.
Third, once all parameters are estimated, we calculate the equilibrium innova-
tion policy, a mapping from all possible market structures a rm might encounter.
This allows us to study how innovation incentives within a single industry, hold-
ing primitives and parameters constant, vary over the possible states the industry
might visit. While the primitives of the model will lead to a particular stochastic
steady state, exogenous shocks such as globalization or mergers might lead to many
dierent industry states with possibly very dierent levels of innovation. With the
optimal dynamic policy vector in hand, it is straightforward to conduct a causal
analysis of market structure on innovation.
1Aw et al. (2011) also study innovation dynamics, but focus on international trade as providing
an incentive for innovation. Their dynamic parameters are those that characterize the sunk cost
distribution for export and R&D activities.
2Examples are: Ryan (2011), who studies the eect of environmental regulation on the cement
industry, and Ellickson and Misra (2008) who study supermarket pricing. Ching (2010) modied the
estimator, simultaneously estimating the demand and policy functions, to study demand dynamics
in prescription drugs after patent expiry. Jenkins et al. (2004) also modied the estimator, allowing
the dynamic parameters to enter nonlinearly, to estimate network eects in the market for internet
browsers.
3The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide background
information on the global automotive industry and the data we use. In Section 3 we
introduce the static and dynamic aspects of the model as well as the Markov Per-
fect equilibrium concept. The two-step estimation methodology and the estimation
results are discussed in Section 4, followed by a sensitivity analysis. In Section 5, we
use the estimated model to analyze the equilibrium interaction between innovation
and market structure. We conclude in Section 6.
2 Background on the industry and the data
2.1 Innovation
The automotive industry is well-suited to investigate the interaction between in-
novation and market structure in a strategic context. Demand estimates|see for
example Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) and Goldberg (1995)|indicate large
markups over marginal costs, consistent with the view that xed costs are impor-
tant in this industry. Innovation is an important source of product dierentiation
as rms' competitive position is improved through higher product quality, greater
reliability, and the introduction of new product features. In addition, the industry
is the poster child for the importance of productivity-enhancing process innovations
(Van Biesebroeck 2003).
Producing automobiles is a highly research-intensive activity. In 2003, more than
13% of all R&D in the OECD was by rms in ISIC industry 34 `Motor Vehicles',
more than in any other industry. In 2006 the industry was in third place. Statistics
in Table 1 illustrate the importance of automotive R&D in the ve most innovative
economies. Except for the U.S. where it is fourth, the industry is rst or second
in terms of R&D spending in each country. The top 13 rms in the auto industry
spent more than 55 billion dollars on R&D in 2005.
The industry is also a heavyweight on the output side of the innovation process.
In the last 25 years, the same 13 rms were awarded more than 50,000 patents by the
U.S. patent oce.3 We measure the innovative activities of rms by the number of
patents they apply for in each calendar year.4 We use patents applied for instead of
35% of all patents led in the European patent oce (by E.U. applicants) are in the narrow IPC
category B60 \Vehicles in general", which is only one of 127 categories and contains only a subset
of motor vehicle related innovations; the corresponding fraction at the U.S. patent oce is 3%.
4Patents are a widely used measure of innovation output. In his survey on use of patents as a
measure of technological progress, Griliches (1990) concludes: \In spite of all the diculties, patents
statistics remain a unique resource for the analysis of the process of technical change." [p. 1701]
4Table 1: R&D expenditure by industry in selected countries (2006, in PPP$b)
Industry (ISIC Rev. 3) USA Japan Germany Korea France
Chemicals (24) 46.3 16.4 8.2 2.1 5.0
Radio, TV, telecom. equipment (32) 31.2 12.2 4.1 13.3 2.8
Motor vehicles (34) 16.6 17.9 14.4 4.2 4.6
Medical, precision, optical instr. (33) 22.4 4.6 3.5 0.4 1.6
Computing and related machinery (30) 7.4 14.1 0.6 0.4 0.2
Note: Includes all sectors in the top three by R&D expenditure in any of the ve countries.
Industries are sorted by total R&D expenditure across the ve countries.
Source: OECD ANBERD database, edition 2009 (online).
patents granted to minimize time delay problems. We use patents instead of R&D
expenditure, because only in recent years is the R&D data available for all rms
in consolidated global accounts. Moreover, these rms also spend vast amounts on
engineering and design, which in some countries might be partially included in R&D
expenditures.
The information about patents comes from the PATSTAT database. Since rms
often le for patents through various subsidiaries, we searched the database for all
records containing the core of the parent rm's name and manually veried the re-
sults. The number of applications for each rm-year observation to the U.S. and
European patent oces are combined as follows: xjt = max(xUS
jt ;xEU
jt ).  is the
relative weight given to more expensive and more demanding European patents. It
is computed by taking the ratio of U.S. to European patents observed for four large
rms (Daimler, Ford, Honda and Toyota) that have signicant sales and production
in both regions. We compute this weight to be 2:36. It implies that for automo-
tive rms one European patent represents the same amount of innovation as 2:36
American patents.
2.2 Market structure
The automotive industry is concentrated worldwide, making it likely that rms will
take actions of competitors into account when deciding on their own innovative
activities. We measure sales by the number of vehicles sold worldwide by each rm
and its aliates.5 This information is obtained from Ward's Info Bank, the Ward's
Automotive Yearbooks, and the online data center of Automotive News for the most
recent years. Market shares in Table 2 are computed as a fraction of total worldwide
5We do not distinguish between minority share holdings and outright control. E.g. Mazda is
counted as part of the Ford group, even though Ford Motor Co. never held more than 33.4% of
Mazda's shares.
5Table 2: Market shares in the initial and nal year of the sample
1982 2004
Sales Market Sales Market
(in '000) Share (in '000) Share
Chrysler 1,408 (3.8%) [merged with Daimler]
Daimler 701 (1.9%) 4,719 (8.1%)
Ford 5,415 (14.5%) 7,590 (13.1%)
GM 6,463 (17.3%) 8,990 (15.5%)
Honda 1,015 (2.7%) 3,194 (5.5%)
Hyundai 91 (0.2%) 3,328 (5.7%)
Nissan 2,604 (7.0%) [partnered with Renault]
PSA 1,644 (4.4%) 3,375 (5.8%)
Renault 2,026 (5.4%) 5,785 (9.9%)
Toyota 3,282 (8.8%) 6,708 (11.5%)
VW 2,200 (5.9%) 5,079 (8.7%)
Sample total 26,850 (71.9%) 48,768 (83.9%)
Global total 37,337 58,147
Source: Ward's Automotive and Automotive News.
new vehicle sales.
We only focus on the largest global rms, which are responsible for the bulk of
innovation, as we explicitly study strategic interaction. Our sample includes the
eleven largest rms which together sold 72% of all new vehicles worldwide in 1982.
After two big tie-ups, a merger between Daimler and Chrysler in 1998 and a close
partnership between Nissan and Renault in 1999, the number of rms was reduced
to nine. By 2004, the rms in the sample controlled 84% of the global market. The
remaining new vehicle sales are by smaller rms and we assume they do not innovate
strategically.6
A couple of patterns in Table 2 stand out. Only the largest three rms|GM,
Ford, and the union of Nissan-Renault|lost market share over the sample period.
The industry became more symmetric over time as some rms that initially operating
mostly in their home region globalized. The market share gains of the other rms
were not only at the expense of the top rms. They took an additional 12% of
market share away from the peripheral rms, partly as a result of takeovers. The
fortunes of the rms that gained market share also varied. While PSA increased
its share by a third, from 4.4% to 5.8%, Honda more than doubled it from 2.7% to
5.5%, and Hyundai increased it by a factor of more than 25, from 0.2% to 5.7%.
6In the model below, the dierence between global sales and total sample sales will be accounted
for by an outside good.
6Table 3: Summary statistics
Variable Mean S.D. 10th pctile 90th pctile
Patents 311 268 56 769
Sales (in thousands) 3,653 2,439 900 7,866
Log price (reference rm = 0) -0.03 0.13 -0.19 0.19
Eciency (reference rm = 0) -1.53 0.97 -2.35 0.48
Note: The number of observations for each variable is 240.
Again because of our focus on strategic interaction in the global automotive
industry, we abstract from the various vehicle models sold by each rm. Instead,
we assume a `composite' model and construct a price for it by estimating a hedonic
price regression. Pooling all available models in a market over the sample period,
we regress the list price in logarithm on a rich set of vehicle characteristics|see
Goldberg and Verboven (2001) for an example. We include a full set of rm-year
interaction dummies and the coecients on these capture the relative price for each
rm in each year.
This price is relative to the average price charged by a set of peripheral rms,
which are included in the dierence between sample and total market in Table 2. It
measures what consumers are willing to pay for a particular rm's vehicle compared
to a peripheral vehicle with the same characteristics. We estimate this hedonic
regression separately for the U.S. passenger vehicle market, and jointly for ve E.U.
countries.7 The (sales) weighted average of a rm's price in the two markets is its
global price, normalized to zero for the peripheral rms in each year.
The last piece of information we will need to estimate our dynamic model is
the state variable, rm eciency or product quality. We do not use independent
information for this, but use the residual from a transformed demand equation, the
j term in Berry (1994). This measure includes everything that aects a rm's
market share except the observed vehicle characteristics and prices. It is observed
by all rms in the industry, but not by the econometrician. Most importantly for
our purpose, we hypothesize that its evolution is in
uenced by innovation.
Summary statistics for the four variables that enter the model are reported in
Table 3. Recall that the sample contains eleven rms over 23 years (1982{2004).
All rms in the sample are very innovative, applying for an average of 311 patents
per year. The standard deviation of 268 suggests that there is a lot of variation
in innovative activities. Average annual sales in the sample is 3.7 million vehicles,
7We have updated the data sets in Petrin (2002) and Goldberg and Verboven (2001) to 2004
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Figure 1: Aggregate relationship between innovation and market structure
with a standard deviation of 2.4 million. The log price averages around zero (-0.03
to be specic) and 10th to 90th percentiles range from -0.19 to 0.19. The average
eciency level is  1:53, with a standard deviation of 0:97.
2.3 A rst look at the relationship
To illustrate the observed relationship between market structure and innovation
in the raw data, we plot in Figure 1 two measures of innovation at the industry
level against the total number of active rms. Note that we use information on
all 24 internationally active rms in this section and not only on the 11 largest.8
Because the overall rate of patenting in the economy has increased notably over time,
especially after 1984 (Hall 2004), we purge the innovation variables on the vertical
axis from a cubic time trend and plot the residual. The patterns rely solely on time
series variation as the global industry has gradually become more concentrated|we
have reversed the scale of the X-variable to coincide with the progression of time.
Both measures, the total number of patents and the ratio of patents to revenue,
indicate that even after controlling for the time trend innovation was highest in the
later years when fewer rms were active. In the graph on the left this is driven
entirely by the data for the last couple of years when patenting increased markedly.
The tted relationship shows a U-shaped pattern, but the data points indicate that
this was not a gradual evolution. There was a downward trend in patenting over
most of the period as the industry consolidated from 24 to 13 independent rms.
This trend reversed suddenly and strongly once merger activity stopped.
Normalizing the total number of patents by revenue suggests a rather dierent
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Figure 2: Firm-level relationship between innovation and market structure
pattern. The relationship is now clearly positive: the patent-to-sales ratio is in-
creasing in the number of rms. In later years, the relationship breaks down as
the patenting ratio stops its increase. Both patterns are consistent with opposing
`eciency' and `replacement' eects, but which eect dominates depends on the
innovation measure used.
The aggregate relationship hides important underlying variation. Even condi-
tioning on the competitive state of the industry in a given year, there are large
dierences across rms in the number of patents they apply for. The relationship
between rm size, measured by revenue, and the number of patents is depicted in
Figure 2 for the initial and last years. In both years the relationship is inverted-U
shaped (solid lines) and the same holds for the tted relationship over the entire
sample period (dashed lines). On average the smallest rms patent the least, while
the most innovative rms are those in the middle of the size distribution.
This pattern is even more pronounced for patents by revenue as innovation mea-
sure. It is consistent with the evidence for U.K. manufacturing rms in Aghion
et al. (2005). In order to gauge whether the mechanisms leading up to this are also
consistent with their interpretation, we need a model of rm behavior and industry
competition.
3 The Model
We write down a simple model of industry equilibrium with forward-looking in-
novation decisions. Firms decide on their innovation eort based on the current
market structure and a (private) cost of innovation. At the same time, they realize
that their individual decisions collectively and stochastically determine the evolution
9of the market structure. Our modeling strategy follows Ericson and Pakes (1995)
except for the absence of entry and exit which have not been important in this
industry.
Time is discrete. There are n rms in the industry, each producing a single dif-
ferentiated product. Firms are heterogenous with respect to their relative eciency
level, j 2 . At the beginning of each period, rms observe the full state vector for
the industry, their own cost of innovation, and they decide on price and investment
in R&D. While price-setting can be thought of as the equilibrium outcome of a static
Bertrand-Nash game, the investment decisions are the outcome of a dynamic game
of incomplete information.
3.1 The Static Problem
Prices in
uence current prots, but have no eect on the future. They are chosen
conditioning on the industry state vector and in equilibrium no rm should be willing
to deviate unilaterally. The outcome from the static problem is a mapping from all
possible industry states to a vector of prot levels for each rm under optimally
chosen equilibrium prices.
The demand system is derived from a discrete choice model of individual con-
sumer behavior, following Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) and many others
studying the automobile industry. Vehicles dier in quality, , which is observable
to all rms and consumers, but not to the econometrician. There are m consumers
in the market and each buys one vehicle. The utility for consumer i from buying ve-
hicle j depends on its quality, its price and the consumer's idiosyncratic preferences
as follows
uij = p log(pj) + j + "ij; i = 1;:::;m; j = 1;:::;n: (1)
p is the price elasticity of demand.9 The price of vehicle j incorporates an adjust-
ment for a set of vehicle characteristics as described in the data section. In addition
to the n rms that innovate and price strategically and are the focus of our study,
there are a number of peripheral rms. We normalize the consumer's utility from
buying a vehicle from a peripheral rm, the outside good, to zero.
If we assume that the idiosyncratic utility "ij is i.i.d. extreme value distributed,
9We do not use a random coecients model because our main focus is on innovation and not on
substitution patterns or on consumer heterogeneity beyond what is implied by "ij.
10we obtain the following expected market share for rm j:10
j(j; j;pj;p j) =
exp(p log(pj) + j)
1 +
Pn
k=1 exp(p log(pk) + k)
; (2)
where p j is the price vector of all other rms than j in the industry. The expected
demand is simply mj(). The demand that each rm faces depends on the full price
vector for all rms, directly through the denominator of (2) and indirectly through
its own price which, in equilibrium, is a function of its rivals' prices.
Each rm chooses its price taking the industry state and rival prices as given.




j is the marginal cost of rm j and it might vary with the relative eciency level.
This allows for higher vehicle quality translating in higher costs, but also for cost-
reducing process innovations. c are the parameters in the marginal cost function.
The rst order condition for rm j, after some simplication, is
fpj   j()gf1   j()gp + pj = 0: (3)
With n active rms, we have to solve n such rst order conditions simultaneously
to obtain the equilibrium price vector fp
j;p
 jg. Existence and uniqueness of equi-
librium in this context is proved by Caplin and Nalebu (1991). The equilibrium






Once the functional forms and parameter values of the demand and cost functions
are known, the vector of  values for all rms can be calculated for any state of the
industry using equation (4).
3.2 The Dynamic Problem
The optimal innovation decision is a dynamic problem that generates an evolution
for the rm's state variable. We now have to be more specic on the domain  for .
It is dened by specifying lower and upper bounds and discretizing the intermediate
range of possible values in steps of . As a result,  = fmin;min+; ;max 
;maxg. Recall that j is the relative eciency of rm j, dened by normalizing
10Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse (1992, p. 136) illustrate how the CES demand system can
equivalently be motivated using the representative consumer framework.
11the absolute eciency level by the average eciency of a set of peripheral rms.
The benet of this formulation is that j is naturally bounded.
Firms also dier in their cost of R&D, which is the sum of a common part that is a
function of R&D expenditure xj and a private shock j 2 R that is i.i.d. across rms
and over time and only observed by rm j. The state vector for rm j is then given
by f1; ;j; ;n;jg, which we write in short as sj = fj; j;jg.11 These
random shocks perform the same function as the choice-specic state variables in
Rust (1987) or Gowrisankaran et al. (2009). They make sure that each investment
choice has positive probability.
Investment in R&D is a strategic and dynamic decision, chosen each period based
on the expected value of future prot streams. The problem is recursive and can be
described by the following Bellman equation
Vj(j; j;jj) = max





where  is the discount factor and c() the cost of R&D that depends on the dynamic
parameters in x.  combines all parameters of the model. The variables with a prime
denote the next period values. The expectation is with respect to the evolution of
the entire state vector s0
j and rm j conditions this on xj, j, and  j, but not j
as it is assumed to be i.i.d. over time.























 j x jP( j). We need to take the expectation over the rivals'
investments x j as they determine the evolution of the industry state, but they
depend on cost shocks  j that rm j does not observe. t are the parameters in
the state transition function.
The evolution of j is straightforward. We assume it to be i.i.d. over time and
across rms and to follow a normal distribution with a mean of zero and standard
deviation , which is one of the dynamic parameters in the vector x.
The evolution of j, denoted by P(0j;x;t), depends on the rm's choice of xj
and is assumed to depend also on the distance of the rm's relative eciency to the
11The market size m is another state variable that is the same for all rms. To keep the size of
the state space manageable, we assume that it is constant over time.
12frontier max.12
We follow Ericson and Pakes (1995) and assume that next period's eciency
level can only take three possible values if current eciency is j: (j + ), j, or
(j  ). On the discretized domain, eciency can increase or decrease by one step
or stay the same. The probability distribution over these possible future states is
given by the triplet

pU;pS;pD	


















The functional forms for the transition probabilities will incorporate that the rm
cannot move up anymore when it is at max or down when it is at min.
The solution to (5) is a strategy prole xj = j(j; j;jj j). The Markov
Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) of the game is a strategy prole 
j that solves (5)
given that all rivals follow the same equilibrium strategy as rm j. It is given by

j(j; j;jj
 j), which we denote for short as X(s).
In the estimation of the dynamic parameters x we exploit the properties of
the equilibrium strategy prole. The estimation approach is described in the next
section, where we also introduce the functional form assumptions for the marginal
costs and the transition probabilities.
4 Estimation Methodology and Results
We need to estimate parameters from four functions: demand (p), marginal cost
(c), state transitions (t), and the cost of R&D (x). The rst two sets of parameters
can be estimated from the specication of the static problem and the third set is
merely a parametric description of the observed process in the data. The major
challenge is to estimate the dynamic parameters in the cost of R&D function. With
nine to eleven rms in the industry, the brute force method of computing the Markov
Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) and matching predicted to observed innovation decisions
is computationally infeasible.








jt 1 + ^ 
j:
Innovation has a positive eect on the change in eciency, but a higher level of initial eciency
makes it harder to improve further.
13Recently, a number of alternative approaches have been developed that do not
require the calculation of the equilibrium of the game. As observed investment
decisions are equilibrium outcomes, they are used directly to characterize the policy
function and the state transition function (non)parametrically.13
We adopt the two-step estimator of Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007) as it is
directly applicable to our situation with a continuous choice variable.14 In the rst
step, state transition probabilities and the equilibrium policy functions are combined
with the estimates of the period prot function to obtain numerical estimates of the
value function by forward-simulation. In the second step, the dynamic parameters
are chosen to minimize the deviations from equilibrium conditions, which occur when
the value function is higher under policies that dier from the optimal policies.
We present benchmark estimates and some sensitivity checks immediately follow-
ing the discussion of the estimation methodology for the dierent elements of the
model.
4.1 Step 1
4.1.1 Demand and Cost Parameters
The demand side in our model is static and we can follow Berry (1994) to write the
log market share of rm j relative to a base rm as15
log[j()=0()] = p log[pj=p0] + [j   0]:
This can be estimated using the observed market shares and price data. The relative
eciency levels of all rms are then simply the residuals from the demand equation.
Consistent estimation requires that we account for the endogeneity of prices as rms
use unobserved vehicle quality in their pricing decisions. In particular, we expect
the price coecient to be biased upward if we estimate with ordinary least squares.
The usual instruments in this context are the product characteristics of rival rms,
see for example Berry et al. (1995). In our case, we do not have any characteristics in
the demand equation, as they have already been accounted for in the construction of
the price series. However, lagged patent activity by rival rms should be correlated
with the quality of their current products and thus be correlated with a competitor
13While this approach is widely used in single agent dynamic problems since Hotz and Miller
(1993), in a dynamic game context the assumption is less innocuous due to the possibility of
multiple equilibria, see Doraszelski and Pakes (2007).
14Alternative approaches that avoid computing the MPE at each iteration include Aguirregabiria
and Mira (2007) and Pakes, Ostrovsky, and Berry (2007).
15All estimators in Step 1 pool data across all years; time subscripts are omitted.
14rm's price. We also include rm-xed eects in the regression, which already absorb
much of the endogeneity as unobserved product quality varies a lot more between
rms than over time. The xed eects are added again to calculate the j series.
Finally, we perform a sensitivity check for the estimation of the dynamic parameters
by selecting a higher and lower price elasticity parameter than the one we estimate.
If marginal costs are assumed constant, the demand function can be estimate
alone. If marginal cost varies with a rm's eciency level, it is estimated jointly
with the rst order condition for price setting to recover both sets of coecients. We
use the following specication for the marginal cost function, where the coecient
on the quadratic term can be xed to zero or estimated freely:
j=0 = c0 + c1~ j + c2~ 2
j + "mc
j (7)
with ~ j = exp(j   0).
The estimates for the three dierent specications of marginal cost together with
the corresponding price elasticity estimates are reported in Table 4. Price enters
negatively and signicantly in each case. Given the log(p) in the indirect utility
function, we are estimating a CES demand model and the coecient on price directly
gives the price elasticity of demand. Joint estimation of the demand with the rst
order condition guarantees an elasticity above unity, but we nd this holds even when
demand is estimated separately. Weak instruments or controlling imperfectly for the
product characteristics in the hedonic price regression would lead to an upwardly
biased price coecient. Both issues do not appear to be problematic.
The estimates range between -3.9 and -2.5, which tends to be lower in absolute
value than the average elasticities that in studies using model-level data. This is
consistent with the more aggregate product denition as the residual demand for a
rm should be less elastic than for an individual model. The implied price-marginal
cost markups are correspondingly lower. Again, this is reasonable because at the
rm level more costs will be variable than at the model level.
The relationship between marginal cost and the unobserved quality term is nega-
tive, in both the linear and quadratic cases.16 It is counterintuitive that rms seem
to be able to produce higher quality vehicles at lower costs. It is therefore better
not to think of  as just product quality, but any unobservable that makes the rm
achieve high sales. It is not surprising that factors that make a rm succeed in the
marketplace are correlated with factors that make it produce eciently.
16The same holds if we specify the logarithm rather than the level of marginal cost as the linear
function in equation (7).
15Table 4: Parameter estimates for demand and marginal cost functions
Constant MC Linear MC Quadratic MC
(1) (2) (3)
Demand parameters
Price -3.925 -2.950 -2.512
(1.605) (0.431) (0.413)
Marginal cost parameters
Constant term 0.059 -0.042 -0.225
({) (0.012) (0.059)




Notes: Includes rm-xed eects in demand and instruments price with lagged patenting of
rivals. In columns (2) and (3), demand and the rst order condition are estimated jointly.
,
 indicate signicance at the 1% and 5% level.
4.1.2 Policy function and state transition
In addition to the demand and cost parameters, we need the values of future state
variables to calculate future prots. Using the observed patenting decisions, we
characterize the empirical innovation policy as a function of the state variables.
Ideally, the control variable x should be modeled as a completely 
exible func-
tion of a rm's own state and the full vector of its rivals' states. Given the data
limitations, we use the following specication:
xjt = 1 t + 2t + 3max





t + ejt; (8)
which includes the mean, maximum, and standard deviation of the  distribution
as well as the rm's own eciency and eciency squared. We also include two
dummies for the post-merger periods for Daimler-Chrysler and Nissan-Renault. ejt
is an approximation error between the innovation that the true policy function would
generate and our prediction. We do not report the full set of coecients for the
policy function as they have no direct interpretation. Note that the policy function
is re-estimated for robustness checks with dierent marginal cost specications.
Innovation stochastically determines the evolution of the state variable according
to the three probabilities in equation (6). Let p 2 [0;1] be the probability that a
rm's eciency moves up by one step and d 2 [0;1] the probability that it depreciates
by one step. Assuming that p and d are independent,17 the probabilities of moving
17This assumption is consistent with the data. If we add an interaction term between xjt 1 and
16up, staying put, or moving down are
pU = p(1   d)
pS = pd + (1   p)(1   d)
pD = (1   p)d;
and we use the following parameterizations for p and d:








This specication has several attractive properties. First, if t2 > 0 patenting
increase the probability that eciency increases. Second, if innovation goes to in-
nity, eciency increases almost surely. Third, even if a rm does not innovate
there is some positive probability that its eciency improves. Fourth, if t3 > 0, the
probability that eciency depreciates is inversely related to the distance from the
frontier.
Together these probabilities fully dene the transition function P(0j;x). They
also imply that when a rm is at maximum eciency, the probability of a further
increases is zero because d = 1. At the other extreme, when the rm is at the
minimum level of eciency, it does not hold automatically that pD = 0 and we need
to enforce this. If  = min, we assume that pD = 0 and adjust pS to equal 1   pU.
We now outline how we estimate the three parameters in the t vector. Because
the state variable  is continuous in the data, we rst need to discretize it. The size
of the state space has an important impact on the computational burden in step 2
and we use a relatively coarse discretization. We limit  to lie in the  3:0 to 0:2
interval and use a distance between consecutive values of 0:4. It implies that  can
take nine dierent values.
In Figure 3, we plot the continuous  values that are recovered as residuals from
the demand estimation in the top panel. The discretized series is shown in the
bottom panel. The correlation between the two is 0:943, suggesting that the ap-
proximation works reasonably well. Moreover, Figure 3 shows that there is sucient
variation in the discretized  series over time that we can hope to capture interesting
dynamics.
Following Rust (1987), we estimate the state transition parameters by maxi-
mum likelihood. Recall that a change in  can take only three possible values:




and evaluate them using the  and x values
jt 1 in the regression in footnote 12, its coecient is statistically insignicant.
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Figure 3: Evolution of eciency for selected rms
Note: The top panel shows the estimated (continuous) values for  and the bottom panel the
discretized eciency levels used in the model.
for each observation. The objective function is then the sum of the logarithms of
the relevant probabilities over all observations in the sample.
The parameter estimates for the three specications for marginal costs are in
Table 5. We faced two problems. First, due to the coarse discretization of , some
of the standard errors are extremely high. With a ner discretization this problem
largely disappears, with t-statistics above 1:5 even for t3. We use the current point
estimates to reduce the computational burden in the next step.
Second, the parameter estimate for t2, which captures the impact of innovation
on the probability that eciency increases, is negative in the third specication,
although it is estimated very imprecisely. It would imply that innovation lowers
the probability of improving eciency. This problem does not appear when using
18Table 5: Transition probability parameters estimates
Constant MC Linear MC Quadratic MC
(1) (2) (3)
t1 1.745 2.469 3.636
(constant term in p) (0.37) (0.48) (0.41)
t2 0.564 0.323 -0.626
(coecient on x in p) (1.11) (1.30) (1.01)
t3 0.656 0.448 -1.105
(coecient in d) (4.10) (4.99) (0.63)
Notes: Maximum likelihood estimates.
,
 indicate signicance at the 1% and 10% level.
the continuous  values in this case, i.e. running a regression similar to the one in
footnote 12. As we need to discretize the state variable for the estimation of dynamic
parameters, we will focus on the rst two specications.
4.1.3 Computation of the Value Function
Combining all the building blocks with a set of initial values for the structural
parameter vector x, we can calculate a numerical estimate of the value function for
any industry state s = f1; ;n;1; ;ng. We do this by forward simulating
prot realizations.
We start from an initial industry state s0: the observed values of t for a given
year supplemented by a set of random draws on the cost shock . The system of
rst-order conditions (3) together with the estimated demand and cost parameters
allow the calculation of the equilibrium price vector. The estimated policy function
directly provides optimal innovation decisions for all rms. Substituting both in the
net prot function vector, equation (4) minus the cost of innovation, gives a vector
of values for all active rms: 0(s0)   c(x0;s0j0
x).
Next, we use the estimated transition probabilities to nd the industry state for
the next period s1. For each (xj;j), j 2 [1; ;n] we compute the three proba-
bilities in (6) and then draw a realization of j1 from the appropriate distribution.
This updates the industry state to s1. Following the same steps as above we can
compute the expected net prot in period 1 for each rm, which is discounted back
to period 0.
This process is repeated T periods, until T gets arbitrarily close to zero. We
have set the discount factor to 0.9 and T to 150 periods (150 = 3:70E-06). The














where the expectation is over future states. We perform these forward simulations
10;000 times using dierent draws for the  shocks and the realizations of the state
transitions. The average over all simulations is the numerical estimate of V (s0j0
x)
for starting state s0. We repeat this for all observed industry states by taking each
as the starting state for a separate set of simulations.
4.2 Step 2
We are nally ready to estimate the dynamic parameters of the model using the
minimum distance estimator proposed by Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007). Let

j(j; j;jj
 j) be the Markov perfect equilibrium policy prole for rm j. For
this to be the equilibrium strategy, the value function following this strategy must







Note that only rm j deviates from the MPE strategy, while its rivals still play their
Nash strategies. Equation (10) will hold at the true value of the parameter vector

x.
Using the forward simulation procedure as described above, we can calculate the







enters the objective function of the minimum distance estimator only if it is negative
as this implies a violation of equilibrium condition (10). For a given vector of x, we
calculate these dierences for all rms j, industry states s, and alternative policies
0. ^ x is then chosen to minimize the sum of the squared negative terms to minimize










The specic alternative policies that we use are the following deviations from the
equilibrium Nash policy: 0
j = (1 + )
j, where  takes the following four values:
[0:90 0:95 1:05 1:10]. And nally, we parameterize the cost of R&D function as:
c(xj;jjx) = (x1 + x2xj + x3~ j) xj; (12)
20Table 6: Dynamic parameter estimates
Constant MC Linear MC
(1) (2) (3)
x1 71 144 83
(coecient on x) (165) (99) ({)
x2 0.066
(coecient on x2) (0.138)
x3 490 441 169
(coecient on ) (220) (226) ({)
Notes: Minimum distance estimation, see text. Standard errors are
bootstrapped.
,
 indicate signicance at the 1% and 5% level.
where ~ j is a standard normal variable and x3~ j = ~ j = j.
The estimates for three dierent specications of the model are reported in Table
6. They are based on a normalization of the marginal cost to 1. The standard errors
are bootstrapped, re-estimating all intermediate parameters as well.18
In the rst column, we use the specication with constant marginal production
cost and a quadratic function for the cost of innovation. To put the magnitudes
in perspective, the expected R&D expenditure to apply for 700 patents, which is
approximately the mean in the last few years of the sample, is estimated to be
85,334 (= 71x + 0.066 x2) times the marginal cost. If we assume that the marginal
cost of producing a vehicle is $15,000, it amounts to a total innovation outlay of
$1.28 billion or $1.78 million per patent. The convexity of the cost of R&D function
implies that the cost per patent rises to $2.33 million for rms at the high end of the
observed patenting range. Moreover, each rm received each period a positive or
negative shock to the cost of R&D and the high estimated standard error indicates
we really need this exogenous source of variation to rationalize observed patenting
rates.
In the second column, we restrict the R&D function to be linear in the number
of patents. The estimate of 144 implies a cost per patent of $2.16 million. Because
the standard error for ^ 1 is much lower in the restricted model, we use this estimate
in the remainder of the paper. The coecient is still not estimated very precisely,
but the p-value for a one-sided test against a zero cost is only 0.073.19
18We draw without replacement 20 subsamples of 12 years each, from the 23 total years in
the sample. For each subsample, we re-estimate demand, policy, and state transition parameters,
and then use forward simulations and the minimum distance estimator to estimate the dynamic
parameters.
19Increasing the number of subsamples raises the precision somewhat, but is computationally
very demanding in our model with up to 11 active rms.
21We have investigated the sensitivity of the estimates in column (2) to the price
elasticity of demand, which is a key parameter in the model. It determines not
only how high the price-cost margins and thus prots are, but also how consumers
trade o lower prices and higher quality. Both are key considerations in the rms'
innovation decision. In the benchmark case with constant marginal cost, the price
elasticity was estimated at  3:92. We re-estimate the dynamic parameters when
the elasticity is set to one half and to double the estimated value.
As the price elasticity rises from  1:96, over  3:92, to  7:85, the ^ 1 estimate
falls from 261, to 144, and 114. The intuition is the following. When demand is
less elastic, markups are higher and so are prots from increased sales. In addition,
consumers value a high vehicle quality relatively more than a low price. As a result,
the incentives to innovate are raised and to rationalize the observed number of
patents in the data we need a higher cost of R&D.
At the same time, the ^ 3 estimate for the standard deviation of the shock to
innovation falls from 1059, to 441, and 19. This is the result from an asymmetric
eect of the cost shocks. As we impose that the cost of R&D can never be negative, a
higher standard deviation mainly has an eect on the positive side, i.e. to discourage
innovation. Several rms in the data are observed to innovate less than we would
predict based on the model primitives and the shock rationalizes their behavior.
When the price elasticity is very high, the incentives to innovate in the model are
reduced and we can t the patenting activity without requiring large variations in
the cost of innovation.
The results reported in the third column of Table 6 allow the marginal production
cost to vary with rm eciency. Recall that we found marginal costs to be declining
in eciency in Table 4, but we nevertheless nd lower estimates for both ^ 1 and ^ 3,
at 83 and 169. It is counterintuitive that the model comes up with a lower cost of
innovation to match observed rates of patenting when patents have the additional
benet of lowering production costs. The explanation comes from the dierences
in state-transition estimates. The lower estimates for ^ t2 in the second column of
Table 5 implies that innovation has less of a positive eect on the probability that
eciency improves in this case. The lower estimate for ^ t3 implies slower depreciation
of eciency, further reducing the incentive to innovate. These eects outweigh the
boost in incentives coming from the production costs.
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5.1 Computation of Equilibrium
Now that we have estimated all the parameters in the model, we can compute just
once the Markov perfect equilibrium strategy of a rm for all possible industry states
it might nd itself in. These strategies will then be used to study the equilibrium
dynamics of market structure and innovation. We follow the algorithm of Pakes and
McGuire (1994) and provide some of the details in the Appendix.
The notorious computational burden stems mainly from three sources. The size
of the state space, the computation of the continuation value, and the number of
iterations that the algorithm takes to converge. To limit the size of the state space we
use a coarse discretization of  as discussed before. We also compute the equilibrium
for eight instead of the nine or eleven rms in the sample. We demonstrate below
that this equilibrium already contains rich dynamics to inform us on the question
of interest. To reduce the burden of computing continuation values in all possible
future market structures, we follow Pakes and McGuire (1994) and assume that from
each eciency level today, a rm can only reach three possible values in the next
period. With eight rm, this still leaves 6,561 (= 38) possible values for the industry
state in the next period.
With these steps, it takes about 10 days of CPU time to compute the equilibrium
once. It is important to point out that for a dynamic game of this size, multiple
equilibria are the rule rather than the exception. We compute just one possible
equilibrium out of the potentially many. For the dierent starting values for X0 and
V 0 that we tried, the algorithm always converged to the same equilibrium.
In Figure 4, we assess the in-sample performance of the model. We compare
optimal innovation under the equilibrium strategy with the observed innovation for
industry states contained in our data set. In Panel (a) of Figure 4 we have sorted all
observations on the horizontal axis in ascending order of expected innovation|the
thick red line. The three thin lines show the expected innovation if the shock to
the cost of R&D is  , 0, and . The circles represent the actual innovation
in the data. The gure illustrates that the vast majority of observed innovation
decisions are within the range of predictions that a one standard deviation cost
shock generates. It is also clear, however, that this range is rather wide.20
In Panel (b), we plot the observed innovation on the x-axis against the predicted
20To avoid negative values for the cost of innovation we have set the standard deviation for the
private R&D shock to one tenth of its estimated value throughout.



























































































































Figure 4: In-sample performance of the model
Notes: (a) The red line shows the expected equilibrium innovation. The three thin lines, starting
from the top, show innovation when the shock to the cost of R&D is  1, 0 and +1, respectively.
The circles show innovation in the data. (b) The scatter plot of innovation in the data and expected
innovation from the model. (c) The scatter plot of innovation in the data and innovation from the
model with the appropriate shock to the cost of R&D.
24equilibrium innovation on the y-axis. The correlation is 0:42 and the model only does
a modest job of predicting the data. This should not be surprising as the estimated
importance of the random shock to the cost of R&D was rather large. We allowed
the shock to the cost of R&D to take one of ve values: f 2; ;0;;2g.
Expected innovation is computed by taking the expectation over the equilibrium
innovation for each possible realization of the shock. In Panel (c), we report the
equilibrium innovation when we pick for each observation the value of the shock (out
of the 5 possible values) that minimizes the dierence between actual and equilibrium
innovation. The correlation between the actual and equilibrium innovation is now
0:94, illustrating that the model is capable of rationalizing the data quite well.
In Figure A.1 in the Appendix we further illustrate that the calculated optimal
investment policy leads to an evolution of eciency levels that captures the observed
patterns quite well. Starting from the observed industry state in 1982 for the eight
largest rms, we simulate the industry forward till 2004 one thousand times using
the optimal innovation policy. The average evolution (red lines) track the actual
evolutions (black lines) rather well.21 The average correlation between the actual
and predicted eciency levels is 0:75.
5.2 Equilibrium Relationship between Market Structure and Inno-
vation
We now turn to the main question that motivated the paper: what is the equilib-
rium relationship between market structure and innovation in the global automobile
industry? We illustrate several patterns by graphing optimal innovation using the
MPE policy vector against specic variations in market structure.
We use the optimal policies that we calculated for all possible market structures
because in the data we only observe a small set of states for the industry. This
is illustrated in Figure A.2 in the Appendix, where we forward simulate the model
using optimal innovation and random draws on the transition process. The gure
shows the average eciency in the industry for one thousand periods starting from
an initial state where all eight rms have j =  0:5. We see that there can be quite
dramatic endogenous changes. For example, in the 30 periods following t = 380, the
average eciency level increases from close to  1 to almost  0:1. There are several
such episodes and they imply even more dramatic changes at the rm level. We also
see that, despite the sometimes dramatic changes, the industry is in a stochastic
steady state.
21The averaging over dierent industry realizations has smoothed the predicted evolution.
25Figure 5: Innovation as a function of the quality gap
Notes: The dierent markers represent various possible market structures that give the same
average quality for lagging rms.
When we use the optimal MPE vector to study the impact of market structure on
innovation, we always hold constant the own eciency level of the rm we study. The
model generates a strong positive relationship between a rm's eciency level and
its innovation, which is illustrated in Figure A.3 in the Appendix. In the following
three gures, we hold the eciency of a rm constant and study how its optimal
innovation changes when we vary the market structure that the rm operates in.
The rst pattern in Figure 5 illustrates that the leading rm innovates most when
its advantage over lagging rms is largest. The blue markers at the top show the
innovation of the leader in a variety of market structures where its own eciency is
always at the same level.22 The red markers show that innovation of lagging rms
increases as they catch up to the leader, but this mostly re
ects the strong positive
correlation between own-eciency and innovation already alluded to before.
The magnitude of the eect on the leader is very large. Faced with a group of
lagging rms that are all at minimum eciency, the leader innovates 50% more than
when the other rms have almost caught up. Note that this large innovation response
shows up even though we keep the leader's own eciency level xed throughout. A
change in innovation of 0.5 represents applying for 500 fewer patents per year and
it is more than half of the additional innovation performed by the average lagging
22We have normalized the minimum of  to zero and chosen a level of 3.2 for the leader.
26Figure 6: Innovation as a function of mean-preserving quality dispersion
rm as its eciency level is raised over the full range of the state variable.23.
The second pattern in Figure 6 looks at innovation of a rm holding constant
not only its own eciency level and its relative position in the industry, but also
the average level of eciency for the industry as a whole. On the horizontal axis we
measure the dispersion of eciency in the industry, where variation is added in a
mean-preserving way. On the vertical axis we indicate innovation of the middle rm
(green markers), the average innovation for the industry (solid line) and the lowest
and highest industry average innovation across dierent market structures (dashed
lines).24
The central pattern in this gure is of declining innovation as eciency becomes
more unequal. The middle rm innovates less when its distance to the industry
leaders grows, even though its own advantage over laggards grows by the same
amount. Average innovation falls as well, which is the result of a concave relationship
between innovation and own eciency (Figure A.3). As a result, holding total
eciency for the industry constant, total innovation is maximized when the eciency
is divided equally among rms.
23Figure A.3 in the Appendix shows that the innovation of a group of symmetric rms grows by
approximately the same amount, from 0.25 to 0.75, if their eciency level is raised over the full
range of the state variable
24We only show market structures where no rm is at zero eciency as the sudden drop in
innovation at that point would introduce small jumps in the gure.
27The previous pattern in Figure 5 works against this trend of declining average
innovation with dispersion. Innovation incentives for the leaders get stronger as
their advantage grows, but this eect is not strong enough to overcome the eect
of concavity. It does show up, however, in a less pronounced decline of the average
innovation level compared with the decline for the middle rm.
These same eects also give rise to a positive and more than proportional rela-
tionship between concentration in innovation and in eciency. When the allocation
of the state variable is more concentrated, innovation is also more concentrated.
The relationship, shown in Figure A.4 in the Appendix, is even steeper than the
45 degree line. A 50% rise in the Herndahl index for eciency can double the
Herndahl index for innovation. At the same time, total innovation for the industry
is a declining function of the concentration in eciency, in line with the dispersion
results in Figure 6.
Another interesting question is whether industry leaders innovate more than fol-
lowers. However, it is dicult to make such a comparison while holding constant own
eciency and total eciency for the industry. The only way to do this is to make
the distribution less dispersed when we consider the leader's innovation, but Figure
6 already demonstrated that this in itself raises innovation. We made a number of
comparisons for an industry consisting of just three rms and found innovation to
be between 1.1% and 3.3% higher for a leader compared to a follower with the same
eciency level, when holding total eciency in the industry constant as well.
We can make similar comparisons to verify whether a rm at the very bottom
innovates more or less than a rm in the middle. Again, the only way to do this
while holding own eciency and total industry eciency constant is to make the
distribution less dispersed for the bottom rm. Across several cases, we nd that
the bottom rm innovates 0.7% to 4.1% more than the middle rm. These results
suggest that innovation is higher for rms at the very top or bottom than for rms
in the middle, but we cannot rule out entirely that this is the result of eciency
dispersion rather than the rm's own position in the industry.
The above results are all for the specication of the model with constant marginal
production costs. The pattern in Figure 5 is similar when we use the model with
marginal production costs declining in eciency. Only the range of innovation over
dierent possible market structures is wider, both for the leader and lagging rms.
The pattern in Figure 6 is similar for the middle rm, but the average innovation in
the industry is now increasing in dispersion, see Figure A.5 in the Appendix. The
reason is that the relationship between own-eciency and innovation is still increas-
ing, but now has an S-shape rather than being concave. It makes the innovation
28Figure 7: Innovation as a function of the number of rms
boost for the leading rms more important and suggests that in this case aggregate
innovation would be much higher if eciency were highly asymmetric.25
The last pattern in Figure 7 illustrates how innovation changes when the number
of competitors is exogenously increased.26 Again, we hold the relative and absolute
position of a rm constant and plot its optimal level of innovation as we add rms to
the market. Additional rms are always entered at the mean level of eciency. The
blue circled markers are for a rm that is also at the mean eciency level, i.e. all
rms in the industry are symmetric in this case. The gure shows a monotonically
declining rate of innovation with competition, consistent with the eciency eect.
As the number of active rms increases in a market of constant size, prot rates will
go down and innovation incentives with them. Firms do take some market share
away from the outside good, but it is not enough to compensate for the additional
competition. Note that the interpretation here is really the innovation response
to an exogenous change in market structure as we always use the optimal MPE
innovation policy.
The same pattern of declining innovation with competition holds for leading and
lagging rms, but for rms that are ahead of the new entrants the innovation decline
25The same mechanism also leads to higher average innovation for higher levels of the Herndahl
index in eciency in this case.
26To construct this gure we computed the optimal policy vector for dierent numbers of active
rms.
29is much less pronounced. To illustrate this more clearly, we included red lines on
the graph that express innovation of an existing leading or lagging rm relative to
the innovation of rms at average eciency, either existing or new entrants. The
interpretation of the red lines is that they are the optimal innovation policies of
leaders or laggards, relative to the optimal policies of average rms.
For existing industry leaders, their relative rate of innovation increases strongly
when additional competitors enter the market. A rm with a competitive advantage
will increase its innovation lead over other rms when faced with more competition.
While its absolute level of innovation is declining with entry, it declines much less
than the innovation of other (average) rms. This pattern is in line with the replace-
ment eect. A rm that is innovating to defend its competitive position, increases
the gap with other rms when facing more competition.
6 Concluding remarks
We have accomplished two things. First, we estimated all parameters in a structural
game-theoretic model of strategic, forward-looking, innovating rms for a particular
sector. Second, we calculated the optimal Markov-perfect equilibrium policy for
this game for all possible industry states and used it to investigate how optimal
innovation responds to exogenous changes in market structure.
The structural approach in this paper has a number of advantages over reduced
form approaches that look directly at the relationship between innovation and mar-
ket structure in the data. It allows us to focus on the equilibrium relationships and
do away with worries about endogeneity of market structure and reverse causality
of innovation on market structure. In fact, the structural approach tackles the en-
dogeneity problem directly by modeling the market structure and its evolution. The
structural model can accommodate non-monotonic eects of market structure on
innovation, which we can investigate by holding some aspects of market structure
constant while varying others. It also allows us to study the relationship across a
wide range of industry states, even though only a limited set is observed in the data.
Our approach is also complementary to theoretical work studying the same ques-
tion. While it is useful to know what type of eects are possible in a model of
prot-maximizing rms, it is equally important to know which of these eects are
most important in a model where the primitives are estimated from the data. We
relied on a functional form for demand and a price setting assumption that are
widely used in static models of the automobile sector. The implementation to the
global industry necessitated some more assumptions, but the estimated model, in
30particular the dynamic policy vector, is consistent with the observed data.
We learned a number of things. The parameter estimates in the demand, marginal
cost, and state transition equations are all plausible. Most, importantly, the model
implies average R&D expenditure of approximately $1.78 million per patent and
this cost is increasing in the rate of patenting. To t the data, the model requires a
relatively large rm-specic element to the cost of R&D.
In terms of the response of optimal innovation to changes in market structure
we can highlight the following patterns. First, innovation by the industry leader
is strongly decreasing in the eciency of the lagging rms. Second, holding own-
eciency constant, innovation is decreasing in the dispersion of eciency in the in-
dustry. Third, whether total industry innovation increases or decreases with disper-
sion of eciency depends on the specication of marginal production costs. Fourth,
higher concentration in eciency leads to a more than proportional increase in the
concentration of innovation. Fifth, innovation is declining in the number of active
rms. Sixth, the innovation gap between the leader and other rms increases with
competition.
One limitation of the analysis is the assumption of i.i.d. shocks to the cost of
R&D over time. It appears from the data that the innovation level of rms persists
over time and this might be the result of persistent shocks to the cost of R&D. Some
rms are consistently better at innovation than others. We did not incorporate
persistent shocks, but believe that this is an interesting area for future research.
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34Appendix: Implementing the Pakes-McGuire algorithm
The Pakes-McGuire (PM) algorithm starts with arbitrary value and policy functions
V 0 and X0 that are dened over the entire admissible state space. We update these
functions pointwise and iterate until they converge to their equilibrium values. The
updating goes as follows.
For rm j in state (j; j;j), we nd its equilibrium level of innovation given
V 0 and X0














The functional form for marginal cost in (12) immediately gives the left hand side:
@c(xj;j)
@xj
= x1 + 2x2xj + j:





































































and ~  = (max   )=(max   min). Substituting the two derivatives into the f.o.c.












The left hand side in equation (13) is linearly increasing in x and the right hand
side is convexly decreasing because ^ x2 > 0. If the term in square brackets is strictly
positive when x = 0, equation (13) yields a strictly positive and nite equilibrium
value x. If the term is negative, we have a corner solution and we set x equal to
zero. We set the standard deviation of the mean-zero error term j to one tenth its
estimated value to avoid negative values for the cost of innovation.
Once we know the optimal x
j we can substitute it in the right hand side of the
Bellman equation to update the value function:






































































































































































































Figure A.1: Evolution of eciency () in the model and in the data.
Notes: The black lines show the actual evolution of eciency for the eight largest rms in the
sample. The red lines show the evolution of eciency when the 1982 industry state is simulated
forward using the MPE policy (averaged over one thousand simulations).



















































Figure A.2: Evolution of average industry eciency
Notes: The graph is based on a single forward simulation of the model for one thousand periods.
The starting eciency level is  0:5 for all 8 rms in the model.
Figure A.3: Innovation as a function of own quality
37Figure A.4: Concentration of eciency and innovation
Notes: The concentrations are measured by the Herndahl indices for rm shares of the state
variable (eciency/quality) and innovation. The average innovation is plotted on the right scale
against the quality concentration, holding total industry quality constant.
Figure A.5: Innovation as a function of mean-preserving quality dispersion with
marginal production costs declining in innovation
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